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sdiscussed in more detail in Chapter 1, the law of war
has historically encompassed two main foci: jus ad
bellum and jus in bello. The former addresses the
legality of going to war and historically took the form of theo-
logical and then secular ‘‘just war’’ theories; the latter concedes
the de facto existence of war and seeks to regulate belligerent
conduct within it. Although some of the world’s greatest minds
grappled with establishing standards for determining when
states had the right to go to war, by the late nineteenth century,
the right to wage war began to be viewed as an incident of state
sovereignty. Further development of the jus ad bellum was all
but eclipsed by prolific developments in jus in bello. Nonethe-
less, these two approaches to regulating warfare converged in
the charters of theWorldWar II international tribunals, which
prosecuted violations of both bodies of law as crimes giving rise
to individual criminal responsibility.
In the postwar period, violations of jus ad bellum (referred
to as ‘‘crimes against the peace’’ at Nuremberg and Tokyo) all
but disappeared from the pantheon of international criminal
law (ICL). Instead, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter addressed
states— rather than individuals—and prohibited the ‘‘threat
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or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.’’ Under the Charter
regime, breaches of this provision give rise to state responsi-
bility, rather than individual criminal responsibility.
Contemporary international law now views the conceptual
distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello as
axiomatic: The legal evaluation of the conduct of hostilities is
an inquiry entirely independent of the legal evaluation of the
lawfulness of the resort to armed force. Accordingly, a just (or
lawful) war may be fought unlawfully, and an unjust (or
unlawful) war may be fought lawfully. Under the jus in
bello, by consequence, all parties are treated equally,
regardless of who initiated the armed conflict and their rea-
sons for doing so. Indeed, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) remains strictly agnostic about the
cause(s) of any armed conflicts in which it operates while
strictly scrutinizing their consequences. That said, there is
an intuitive appeal to the position, still advocated by some,
that any act of armed force committed within the context of
an unlawful war should ipso facto be treated as a war crime.
In addition, many groups fighting against what they consider
to be oppressive, racist, or occupier states have argued that
any act committed in furtherance of a just war must itself also
be deemed just and lawful.
Although crimes against the peace merit only a short chap-
ter in the annals of ICL, the idea that the resort to war itself is a
criminal act has proven to be more than mere history. The jus
ad bellum and jus in bello have reunited in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), although the full scope of
the crime of aggression— the modern lexicon for crimes
against the peace—has yet to be determined. This chapter
briefly traces some high points in the development of the
penal components of these two bodies of law. It then presents
the basic framework for understanding the contemporary law
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of aggression and then war crimes, noting areas in the law that
remain in flux. Underlying this chapter is a rich legacy of legal
rules aimed at the regulation of hostilities that belies the claim
by Cicero that silent enim leges inter arma—the laws are silent
among those at war.
JUS AD BELLUM
The Original Crime of Aggression
The charters for both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
contained the charge of ‘‘crimes against the peace’’ alongside
the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
postwar architects of international justice defined crimes
against the peace somewhat tautologically at Article 6(a) as
‘‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggres-
sion, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances.’’1 In addition, the charters allowed for the pros-
ecution of individuals for ‘‘participation in a common plan or
conspiracy’’ to commit aggression. CountOne of theNuremberg
Indictment charged all the defendants with conspiring to
commit crimes against the peace. Count Two charged all
but five defendants with committing crimes against the
peace. All but four defendants were charged with war crimes
in Count Three.
Although the World War II defendants did not submit to
the equally novel crimes against humanity charge without
objection, the crimes against the peace charge was the most
controversial element of the charters at the time. Both sets of
defendants argued that the concept of crimes against the peace
violated the principle of legality, because war had never before
been criminalized in international law, so the prohibition
against crimes against the peace in the two charters was, in
effect, ex post facto legislation. As is discussed more fully in
Jus Ad Bellum
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Chapter 5 on the defense of nullum crimen sine lege, the tri-
bunals ruled that the proven acts of aggression were unlawful,
and thus criminal, under extant treaties and customary norms,
although none of these sources expressly provided for criminal
penalties in the event of a breach.
The crime of aggression was the centerpiece of the Charter
and the Nuremberg Trial, which was to be ‘‘the Trial to end all
wars.’’ Indeed, a majority of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s judg-
ment consists of describing the aggressive acts of Germany,
including the invasions of (inter alia) Poland, Austria, Czecho-
slovakia, and Belgium in violation of the Kellogg–Briand Pact,
various bilateral treaties and assurances of nonaggression, and
declarations of neutrality. In its final judgment, theNuremberg
Tribunal reasoned that belligerency was the proximate cause of
all the other crimes alleged: ‘‘[t]o initiate a war of aggression,
therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that
it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.’’2
Given the importance of this crime in the postwar period, it is
noteworthy that none of the statutes of the contemporary ad
hoc tribunals contains the crime of aggression, even though it
would have arguably been relevant in the conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone.
The tribunals laid the foundation for the recognition of the
crime of aggression. As peace descended on the globe, states
immediately turned to the creation of the United Nations, an
institution primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace
and security. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, quoted earlier,
sets forth a presumption against the use of force internation-
ally. The UN Security Council bears the primary responsibility
for maintaining international peace, through identifying
threats to the peace and acts of aggression (Article 39) and
deciding on measures, including the use of armed force, in
response (Articles 41 and 42).3 The Charter recognizes only
two scenarios in which the use of force by a state is potentially
6 The Legal Regulation of War
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lawful: in response to Security Council authorization and in
self-defense (Article 51).* In addition, the Responsibility to
Protect initiative of the United Nations raises questions
about the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention where
such an intervention is not employed against the territorial
integrity or political independence of a state but in defense
of individuals in need.4 All these Charter provisions address
potential state responsibility for acts of aggression, not
individual criminal responsibility. Collectively, they signifi-
cantly weaken von Clausewitz’s claim that ‘‘war is a mere con-
tinuation of policy by other means’’5 by largely invalidating it as
a valid policy choice.
In the postwar period, the international community failed
to draft a comprehensive treaty setting forth the elements of
the crime of aggression as it did with genocide and war crimes.
In taking up the proposal for establishing a permanent inter-
national criminal court, the International Law Commission
(ILC) promulgated a Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind that was to provide the sub-
stantive law to be adjudicated before the proposed court. Early
versions of the Draft Code designated the crime of aggression
as a crime against the peace and security at Article 2 and
defined the crime as:
(1) Any act of aggression, including the employment by
the authorities of a State of armed force against another State
for any purpose other than national or collective self-defence
* Article 51 reads: ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken byMem-
bers in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and respon-
sibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.’’ The conditions under which states may claim preemptive or antic-
ipatory self-defense remain contested under international law.
Jus Ad Bellum
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or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a com-
petent organ of the United Nations.
(2) Any threat by the authorities of a State to resort to an
act of aggression against another State.6
In 1954, the Draft Code project went into quiescence, not to
be fully revived until the 1990s.
In 1974, the UN General Assembly unanimously passed
Resolution 3314 to ‘‘guide’’ the Security Council in determin-
ing the occurrence of aggression in the exercise of its Chapter
VII power.7 Article 1 provides that aggression is the ‘‘use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’’
The resolution contains in Article 3 a nonexhaustive list of acts
comprising aggression, regardless of the existence of a decla-
ration of war, that includes:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of
the territory of another State, or any military occupation,
however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack,
or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of
another State or part thereof,
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against
the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a
State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the
armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land,
sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within
the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiv-
ing State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in
the agreement or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it
has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that
6 The Legal Regulation of War
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other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third
State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount
to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.8
The resolution at Article 5(2) states that a ‘‘war of aggression is
a crime against international peace,’’ but the remainder of the
resolution is geared toward state, rather than individual,
responsibility. Notwithstanding this consensus definition of
aggression, only a few states have incorporated the crime of
aggression into their penal codes.9 Nonetheless, when the
international community again turned to the drafting of a stat-
ute for a permanent international criminal court in the 1990s,
many state delegates argued for the revival of the crime of
aggression in keeping with the Nuremberg and Tokyo legacy.
The Modern Crime of Aggression
Article 5(1) of the ICC Statute lists the crime of aggression as a
crime over which the ICC has jurisdiction. Delegates to the
Rome Conference, however, were unable to agree on the
crime’s definition or on any applicable jurisdictional precondi-
tions. Accordingly, Article 5(2) promises that the Court ‘‘shall
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123
defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.
Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provi-
sions of the Charter of the UnitedNations.’’ Resolution F of the
Final Act of the Rome Conference requested that the Prepara-
tory Commission prepare proposals for a provision on aggres-
sion to be presented to the Assembly of State Parties. The
anticipated provision is to be considered at the first Review
Conference, to be held in 2009 or 2010.10 Thus, the Court
Jus Ad Bellum
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cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until
this Committee completes its work and a definition of aggres-
sion is approved by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of
State Parties and ratified by seven-eighths of the State Parties.
In 2002, the Assembly of State Parties adopted a resolution
that established a Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, with Ambassador Christian Wenaweser of Liech-
tenstein now serving as chair, to continue to work on a proposed
amendment to the ICC Statute.11 The group is open to all
states, including non–State Parties. Two main issues facing
the Special Working Group are defining the crime in terms of
individual conduct, which requires coordination with the
General Principles set forth in Part 3 of the Rome Statute,
and identifying any preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Defining the Crime of Aggression
The definition of the crime of aggression has several elements
that have eluded drafters. These include elements addressing
issues of personal jurisdiction, actus reus, mens rea, applicable
forms of responsibility, and the necessity to show state action.
Although much remains in flux, the crime of aggression is cur-
rently formulated in terms of state action: It must be shown that
a state committed an act of aggression as defined by the statute.
If such a showing is made, then individuals who knowingly and
intentionally ordered or otherwise participated actively in the act
of aggression can be prosecuted for their contributions thereto.
The draft amendment to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes for the
crime of aggression has not been significantly amended since
2002. At that time, the proposed amendment included the
following elements for the crime of aggression:
1. The perpetrator was in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of
the State which committed an act of aggression as
defined by element 5.
6 The Legal Regulation of War
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2. The perpetrator was knowingly in that position.
3. The perpetrator ordered or participated actively in the
planning, preparation or execution of the act of
aggression.
4. The perpetrator committed element 3 with intent and
knowledge.
5. An act of aggression, that is to say an act referred to in
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314, was
committed by the State.
6. The perpetrator knew the actions of the State amounted
to an act of aggression.
7. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity, and scale
constituted a flagrant violation of the Charter of the
United Nations.
8. The perpetrator had intent and knowledge with respect
to element 7.
A preliminary challenge facing drafters has been to deter-
mine who in a military or civilian hierarchy may be charged
with the crime of aggression. Early in the discussions, delegates
proposed that the crime of aggression should be chargeable
only against individuals in leadership positions rather than
against the rank and file. According to current formulations
of the ‘‘leadership clause,’’ the defendant must be in a ‘‘position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State.’’12
A second area of discussion has concerned the actions of
the relevant state to which the defendant was connected. This
has been framed as a circumstance element of the crime of
aggression on the theory that aggression can only be committed
through the collective act of a state by harnessing the state’s
war-making machinery.* Delegates have debated whether this
provision should include a generic definition of aggression or
* Most definitions of aggression do not consider the possibility of aggression
being committed by non- or substate groups, and few argue that it should. But see
Jus Ad Bellum
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an enumerated list along the lines of, and perhaps identical to,
Articles 1 and 3 in G.A. Resolution 3314. To date, the pre-
ferred approach has been the combination of a generic chapeau
followed by a nonexhaustive list of specific acts mirroring the
structure of the crimes against humanity article in the ICC
Statute. In this regard, the terms of Resolution 3314 have
exerted a strong pull, especially among the African and Arab
states, with delegates resisting efforts to either amend its list of
aggressive acts or exclude reference to the resolution
altogether. In addition, delegates have debated whether to
include language limiting the jurisdiction of the Court to ‘‘fla-
grant’’ or ‘‘manifest’’ acts of aggression in violation of the UN
Charter. Some states have argued that such a threshold is
inherent to Article 1 of the ICC Statute, which limits the
Court to considering ‘‘the most serious crimes of international
concern.’’
A third open question concerns the nature of the defen-
dant’s participation in the act of aggression. Delegates have
adopted two approaches— the so-called differentiated
approach applies all forms of responsibility in Article 25(3)
to the crime of aggression except for subparagraph (f) addres-
sing attempt. Article 25(3) sets forth various forms of respon-
sibility applicable to all crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC: committing a crime; ordering, soliciting, or inducing
a crime; aiding or abetting a crime; or contributing to the
commission of a crime through a group acting with a common
Antonio Cassese, On Some Problematical Aspects of the Crime of Aggression, 20
Leiden J. Int’l L. 841, 846 (2007) (‘‘[t]here is . . . no logical or legal obstacle to
rules on aggression also criminalizing aggressive acts by non-state entities (such
as terrorist armed groups, organized insurgents, liberation movements, and the
like) against a state. . . . If the purpose of the relevant international rules is to
protect the world community from serious breaches of the peace, one fails to see
why individuals operating for non-state entities should be immune from criminal
liability for aggressive conduct.’’).
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purpose.* The ‘‘differentiated’’ draft text reads as follows (with
contested and alternative language indicated by parentheses):
‘‘that person (leads) (directs) (organizes and/or directs)
(engages in) the planning, preparation, initiation or execution
of an act of aggression/armed attack.’’ Alternatively, the so-called
monist approach considers the various forms of commission out-
lined inArticle 25(3) to be inapplicable to the crimeof aggression
and allows for prosecution only where the defendant has
‘‘order[ed] or participate[d] actively in the planning, prepara-
tion, initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed
attack.’’ Some delegates also took the position that Article 28
addressing superior responsibility does not apply to the crime
of aggression.
Preconditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction
The placeholder text in Article 5(2) of the ICC Statute pro-
vides that any future definition of aggression in the ICC Stat-
ute ‘‘shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.’’ This seemingly innocuous
phrase pinpoints one of the most highly contentious issues
of defining the crime of aggression: what role the Security
Council or other UN bodies will play in determining the exis-
tence of a sovereign act of aggression as a prerequisite to the
ICC’s jurisdiction over a case against a responsible individual.
Many states have argued that a prior determination that an act
of aggression by a state has occurred is crucial before the Court
should proceed with an individual prosecution to prevent the
politicization of the Court. They also point to limitations on the
Court’s jurisdiction and its institutional competency, arguing
that the Court is charged with determining individual criminal
responsibility and not state responsibility.




This raises the question of by whom such a prior determi-
nation should be made. Most states assume that any determi-
nation should be made by the Security Council given its
singular role in the UN system in addressing breaches of the
peace.* The ILC, for example, recommended in Article 23 of
its Draft Code that the Security Council must first declare that
an act of aggression occurred by a state before the ICC could
exercise jurisdiction over the crime. Not surprisingly, this
approach was strongly supported by the permanent members
of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). Although the UN Charter
does not explicitly state that only the Security Council may
make that determination, proponents of an exclusive role for
the Security Council argue that UN practice, in light of the
logic and structure of the Charter, dictates this result. Addi-
tionally, these states argue that an absence of a Security Coun-
cil determination will make it difficult to find an individual
liable, because the perpetrator can raise the lack of Security
Council action as proof that his or her nation did not commit
an act of aggression.
Other delegates have argued that Article 39 of the UN
Charter gives only primary, but not exclusive, authority to
the Security Council to determine the existence of an act of
aggression. These delegates argue that the Court should be
able to proceed where a prior determination by the General
Assembly or even the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
been made. Advocates of a broader approach point to Articles
10, 12, and 14, which all allow the UN General Assembly to
consider and make recommendations about any matters within
* Article 39 of the UN Charter provides that ‘‘the Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.’’
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the scope of the Charter,C and Articles 36 and 65 of the Stat-
ute of the ICJ, which extend the Court’s advisory* and con-
tentious jurisdiction to disputes under international law or the
Charter. There is precedent for General Assembly determina-
tions that states have engaged in acts of aggression and for ICJ
determinations that states have used force in violation of
Article 2(4) of the Charter,13 although the latter is not neces-
sarily the equivalent of a finding that such states committed
acts of aggression. Proponents of a nonexclusive role for
the Security Council argue that if the Security Council has
exclusive power to determine whether a sovereign act of aggres-
sion occurred, it may paralyze the Court if the Council is
unwilling or unable to make the predicate determination.
Furthermore, they argue that the veto power may enable the
agents of permanent members or their friends and allies to be
shielded from prosecution. They also note that the Security
C General Assembly Resolution 377, the so-called Uniting for Peace Res-
olution, purports to empower the General Assembly to implement ‘‘collective
measures’’ (including the use of force) when the Security Council cannot
reach consensus in the face of an apparent act of aggression, breach of the
peace, or threat to the peace. See U.N. Doc. No. A/Res/377 (V) A (Nov. 3,
1950). The United States proposed Resolution 377 shortly after the commence-
ment of the Korean War following the exercise of a Russian veto in the Security
Council. The General Assembly has invoked the Resolution ten times since 1950
(for example, after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, provoking an English/
French occupation). Because it allows for the exercise of military force, it
seems that the resolution would a fortiori allow for a declaration that a state
has engaged in an act of aggression.
* The ICJ’s advisory opinions generally involve questions of law rather than
fact, so it is not clear if the ICJ could contribute in the necessary way to an ICC
prosecution in an advisory capacity. Utilizing the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court would require the initiation of a case by a state (presumably the victim of
the act of aggression) against the putative perpetrator state. In addition, at the
moment, Article 119 of the Rome Statute only allows the ICJ to make determina-
tions in disputes between State Parties as to the interpretation of the Rome
Statute. Such intervention is allowed only after the dispute between State Parties
has been referred to the ICJ by the Assembly of State Parties. This provision may
need to be amended if some more active role of the ICJ is contemplated by the




Council has no power to determine the existence of past acts of
aggression, absent immediate threat, whereas the General
Assembly and ICJ are bound by no temporal limitations.
Finally, it is argued that a political determination could impede
the development of precedent and customary international
law.
Other states have argued that a prior determination of state
aggression is not necessary at all, notwithstanding the language
of Article 5(2). The concern is that any formal precondition
might hinder the Court’s ability to take cognizance of inter-
national crimes within its jurisdiction and lead to inconsistent
outcomes. Requiring a determination about aggression before
the Court can act may even go so far as to undermine the
legitimacy of the Court by making its work dependent on deter-
minations by the political, and potentially politicized, branches
of the United Nations. To make the case that the ICC Statute
is already adequately ‘‘consistent’’ with the Charter provisions,
proponents of a more autonomous Court point to Article 13 of
the ICC Statute, which allows the Security Council to refer
situations to the Court even if none of the relevant states has
ratified the treaty, and Article 16, which allows the Security
Council to request (subject to indefinite renewal) the Court
to defer an investigation for 12 months in a Chapter VII
resolution.*
In any case, there is wide agreement that to protect the
individual’s due process rights, any prior determination by
another legal or political entity that an act of aggression had
occurred could not be binding on the Court. Thus, the Court
would be empowered to reexamine the existence of an act of
* Article 16 provides that ‘‘No investigation or prosecution may be com-
menced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after
the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.’’
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aggression by the relevant state, and defendants would be able
to refute the determination before the Court. This also ensures
that the prosecution remains subject to the penal burden of
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, which is likely more rigorous
than required by any other UN institution in determining state
responsibility for acts of aggression.
Including the Crime of Aggression in
the ICC Statute
Notwithstanding the ICC’s placeholder provision and this
intense work to reach a consensus definition of aggression,
deep divisions remain among states and nongovernmental
organizations as to whether the ICC should exercise jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression at all. The primary objection
to its inclusion is that the crime of aggression threatens to
indelibly politicize the Court, even if—or especially if—
other UN bodies contribute to the determination that a state
has committed an act of aggression. Under certain proposals,
for example, a Security Council decision not to make a deter-
mination of aggression on purely political grounds would
effectively bar the ICC from considering the matter. The
appearance of unequal justice could threaten the perceived
legitimacy of the Court. As a judicial body, it is argued, the
Court should not be dependent on any political determination
involving crimes within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, aggres-
sion is a crime of state that is by definition committed against
another state, rather than the crime of an individual that is
committed against other individuals. Thus, only collective,
rather than individual, culpability should be considered, and
because the ICC only has jurisdiction over individuals, it is an
inappropriate forumforapportioning suchresponsibility.Finally,
it is argued that there is no modern precedent for the crime of




The debate over the inclusion of the crime of aggression has
also touched on the potential intersection between the crime
and the prohibitions against war crimes. Opponents of including
the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute argue that the harms
experienced by victims of war are captured by the prohibitions
against war crimes (and even potentially those provisions gov-
erning crimes against humanity and genocide). They note that
the crime of aggression adds little to the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the Court given the Rome Statute’s comprehensive jus in
bello provisions. Conversely, it is argued that aggression remains
the supreme international crime that often gives rise to all other
international crimes, as was noted by the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Proponents of fully implementing Article 5(2) contend that a
‘‘clean’’ but nonetheless criminal war— that is, an act of aggres-
sion in which nowar crimes are committed—still harms victims
in a way that should be cognizable by the Court. In the words of
Ben Ferencz, a former prosecutor in the post–World War II
trials and a staunch advocate for the inclusion of the crime of
aggression in the ICC Statute:
Ever since the judgment at Nuremberg, it has been undeni-
able that aggressive war is not a national right but an
international crime. War is the soil from which the worst
human rights violations invariably grow. The U.N. Charter
prescribes that only the Security Council can determine
when aggression by a state has occurred but it makes no
provision for criminal trials. No criminal statute can expand
or diminish the Council’s vested power. Only an independent
court can decide justly whether any individual is innocent or
guilty. Excluding aggression from international judicial scru-
tiny is to grant immunity to those responsible for ‘‘the
supreme international crime’’— omission [of the crime of
aggression] encourages war rather than peace.14
In this way, it is argued that including the crime of aggression
in the ICC Statute will deter political and military leaders from
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resorting to armed force in their relations with each other,
because they will be on notice that the resort to armed conflict
without Security Council approval, or without credible claims
to be acting in self-defense, might give rise to individual
criminal liability. This debate continues. As you cover this
material in your course of study, you might refer to the Web
page of the Working Group, which keeps relatively up-to-date
records of ongoing deliberations.
JUS IN BELLO
Whereas the jus ad bellum governs the decision to utilize armed
force, the jus in bello takes hold once an armed conflict exists.
Historically, the codification of the jus in bello proceeded along
two tracks: one, referred to as Geneva law, is based on the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two 1977 Protocols and
originated under the auspices of the Geneva-based ICRC; the
other, referred to as Hague law, derives from a series of con-
ventions concluded in TheHague in 1899 and 1907. Together,
these sets of treaties regulate many aspects of the conduct of
hostilities, at times in great detail. Geneva law creates inter-
locking legal regimes to protect classes of persons, such as
prisoners of war (POWs) and noncombatants, who are partic-
ularly vulnerable in armed conflicts. By contrast, Hague law
governs the means and methods of warfare.
Until the promulgation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which now bear the distinction of being the first multilateral
conventions to receive universal ratification, a notion that there
were crimes of war that would give rise to individual criminal
responsibility existed only in customary international law and
domestic law, primarily within national military codes. The
Geneva Conventions for the first time considered certain
‘‘grave breaches’’ of the jus in bello to be war crimes, giving
rise to individual criminal responsibility. The law of war crimes
Jus In Bello
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thus constitutes just one element of the jus in bello, as many
applicable rules give rise only to state responsibility. The
remainder of this chapter focuses on the penal provisions of
the jus in bello, because only these aspects of international
humanitarian law (IHL) fall under the rubric of ICL.
Given their long-standing pedigree, there was never any
question that the ICC would exercise jurisdiction over viola-
tions of the jus in bello that give rise to individual criminal
responsibility. The devil, as always, is in the details. This
section sketches out the framework for understanding the
current law of war crimes under ICL. It starts with the
antecedent question of the applicability of IHL altogether,
because the prohibitions against war crimes apply only
where IHL applies. This section next touches on the choice
of law question occasioned by the requirement of conflict clas-
sification. This is followed by a discussion of how ICL distin-
guishes between ordinary criminal acts committed in war and
war crimes— the nexus problem. We then discuss the distin-
guishing features of Geneva and Hague law: protected persons
and the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinc-
tion, respectively. The section concludes with a brief tour of
the ICC Statute’s war crimes provision, because it encom-
passes many—but not all—of the war crimes contained
within IHL treaties and adjudicated by the ad hoc tribunals
as crimes under customary international law. The next chapter
continues this discussion by concluding with a discussion of
the intersections between the international criminal prohibi-
tions against war crimes and terrorism.
Triggering International Humanitarian Law
Not all disturbances, acts of violence, or even uses of military
force trigger the applicability of IHL and thus the prohibitions
against war crimes. The Geneva Conventions themselves pro-
vide little insight into the question of their field of application,
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declaring at Article 2 only that the bulk of their provisions apply
to ‘‘all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.’’ Common Article 3 of those Conventions creates a mini-
regime governing armed conflicts ‘‘not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties’’ without further definition. It is not until Pro-
tocol II, which elaborates on and expands common Article 3,
that we find a clear statement that its provisions do not apply to
‘‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature, as not being armed conflicts.’’
Determining when and where IHL applies in the absence
of more express treaty guidance was a central conundrum of
the work of the two ad hoc international tribunals. In both the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the prosecutor charged indivi-
duals with war crimes for acts of violence committed well
beyond the vicinity of active hostilities. For example, as part
of a general challenge to the jurisdiction of the tribunal,
defendant Tadic´ asserted that the war crimes counts in his
indictment had to be dismissed, because his actions were
not committed in the context of an armed conflict. In uphold-
ing the charges, the ICTY announced a broad test for deter-
mining when IHL is triggered within a particular situation,
touching both on the question of when an armed conflict exists
and the territorial scope of the prohibitions that then apply.
It ruled:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State. International
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until
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a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of
internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until
that moment, international humanitarian law continues to
apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the
case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes
place there.15
The tribunal reached this conclusion by noting that although
the Geneva Conventions are silent as to the geographical scope
of international ‘‘armed conflicts,’’ they do imply that at least
some of the provisions of the Conventions apply to the entire
territory of the parties to the conflict, not just to the place of
actual hostilities. In particular, provisions addressing the treat-
ment of POWs and other individuals captured by opposing
forces are not dependent on any proximity to actual hostilities.
Likewise, the beneficiaries of common Article 3 and Protocol
II governing noninternational armed conflicts are those taking
no active part (or no longer taking active part) in the hostilities.
Further, Article 6(2) of Geneva Convention IV indicates that
‘‘[i]n the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of
the present Convention shall cease on the general close of
military operations.’’ The Tribunal ruled that all these provi-
sions make clear that IHL applies broadly within embattled
territory, such that the charges against Tadic´ should stand.
Where IHL does not apply, other bodies of law may still
penalize the conduct in question. For example, Tadic´ was con-
currently charged with crimes against humanity, the prohibi-
tion of which pertains independent of any armed conflict
(although that had not been definitively established until the
Tribunal so ruled in Tadic´). Acts of violence may also consti-
tute acts of genocide (where protected groups are targeted with
the intent to destroy the group) or acts of terrorism under
international law.Where international law does not criminalize
particular acts of violence, recourse can always be had to extant
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domestic penal law. Many of the war crimes prohibitions find
domestic analogs in the crimes of assault, kidnapping, murder,
and mayhem.
Conflict Classification
Determining that IHL applies to a particular situation
(because it has reached the level of an armed conflict)
immediately triggers a second inquiry: whether the conflict
in question is an international or noninternational conflict.
The 1949Geneva Conventions primarily apply to international
armed conflicts, defined at common Article 2 as ‘‘all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them.’’ This defi-
nition thus requires the presence of two embattled High Con-
tracting Parties. There is a difference, however, between an
international conflict and a conflict that is internationalized or
that involves multiple state parties. Thus, the conflict in
Afghanistan initiated after the events of September 11,
2001, began as an international armed conflict when the
United States and its coalition parties fought the Taliban
and its supporters. This was a conflict between two or more
nation states and was thus ‘‘international’’ within the meaning
of Article 2. Once the government of Hamid Karzai was
installed, the conflict no longer pitted two sovereigns against
each other. At that point, the conflict ceased to be an
international armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions, even though it remained internationalized by the
presence of troops from multiple nations. Most of the articles
of the Geneva Conventions thus no longer apply to this conflict
as a technical matter.
Although the majority of the Geneva Conventions’ provi-
sions govern international armed conflicts (including situa-
tions of foreign occupation), the one exception is Article 3,
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common to all four Conventions, which applies in cases ‘‘of
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.’’ This
article—called a ‘‘convention in miniature’’— sets forth
minimum protections that must be afforded to all individuals
involved in noninternational armed conflicts. The latter termi-
nology is employed in lieu of ‘‘civil war’’ or ‘‘internal war’’ to
encompass the entire range of conflicts that do not meet the
somewhat technical and unintuitive definition of international
armed conflict contained in Article 2. The only textual require-
ment for the applicability of common Article 3 is the occur-
rence of an ‘‘armed conflict’’ within ‘‘the territory’’ of a High
Contracting Party.
The international community adopted two protocols to the
Geneva Conventions in 1977 in response to the changing
nature of armed conflict, which involved the shift to predom-
inantly noninternational armed conflicts, the movement of the
battlefield to population centers, increased civilian involve-
ment in armed conflicts, and the expansion of guerilla warfare.
Most important, Protocol I expands the definition of
international armed conflict to include ‘‘armed conflicts in
which people are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right of self-determination.’’ By elevating these conflicts to
the status of international armed conflicts, and granting a polit-
ical advantage to certain liberation movements, the protocol to
a certain degree invokes the ‘‘just war’’ tradition of the jus ad
bellum. Protocol I also provides a more detailed set of rules
concerning the obligation to discriminate between military and
civilian targets and to utilize proportionate force, and further
defines and clarifies the rules with respect to mercenaries. It
also expands the category of privileged combatants to include
members of guerrilla movements or informal militias that
adhere to certain rules to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population. These rules are more relaxed than those
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contained within the Third Geneva Convention addressed to
POWs, which has led to criticism that the protocol puts civi-
lians at greater risk and provides greater protections to comba-
tants and guerillas. With these provisions, Protocol I reflects
elements of both Geneva and Hague law.
Protocol II elaborates on the minimum rules in common
Article 3. Historically, states were reluctant to create legal rules
governing the conduct of noninternational armed conflicts,
primarily out of fear of legitimizing dissident or insurrectionary
groups and of submitting what had been viewed as internal
matters to international rules and scrutiny. During the drafting
of the four Geneva Conventions, the ICRC and some state
delegates proposed more detailed rules for noninternational
armed conflicts. In the face of steep resistance, all that was
achieved was the laconic common Article 3. The passage of
Protocol II reflects a trend toward a greater acceptance of the
need to regulate conflicts that do not fall within the bailiwick of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Protocol II also established a more precise test for deter-
mining its field of application than exists in common Article 3.
Article 1 states:
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 without modifying its existing conditions or applica-
tion, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered
by [Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to imple-
ment this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
Jus In Bello
171
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature,
as not being armed conflicts.
Thus, Protocol II does not apply until the armed conflict
involves armed groups under responsible command, who
have sufficient control over territory to launch ‘‘sustained
and concerted’’ military operations and also to conduct their
operations in accordance with the rules of war contained in the
protocol. Moreover, Protocol II applies only to a conflict
between a State’s armed forces and rebel or dissident move-
ments. Common Article 3 is broader, and covers armed con-
flicts between such groups competing for power within a state
when the central government is not involved or has ceased to
exist. Common Article 3 also applies to those civil wars in
which guerilla forces lack any fixed location from which to
exercise territorial control or are not led by responsible
command.
A further wrinkle in the exercise of conflict classification
involves conflicts that appear to be noninternational armed
conflicts, because they pit a state’s military against rebel or
insurrectionary forces, but involve the significant intervention
of another nation state. The situation in the former Yugoslavia
is an example of such a conflict. The armed conflict there
began as a classic civil war when ethnic groups within Yugo-
slavia took up arms against each other. Eventually, however,
various republics declared independence, including Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Within Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs (who favored
continued union with Yugoslavia) and the Bosnian Croats
(who favored union with the nascent Republic of Croatia)
came to blows with the Bosnian authorities. The two groups
enjoyed significant financial, logistical, and strategic support
from Belgrade and Zagreb, respectively. In situations in which
this level of support rose to the level of ‘‘overall control’’ over the
Bosnian Serb and Croat paramilitaries, the ICTY has deter-
mined that the war became an international armed conflict,
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essentially pitting two nation states against each other, thus
triggering the whole panoply of Geneva Convention rules.16
Viewed collectively, the Geneva treaty regime establishes a
taxonomy of conflict classification that includes the following:
(a) situations that do not trigger IHL at all (e.g., riots, spo-
radic acts of violence);
(b) noninternational armed conflicts that trigger common
Article 3’s protections;
(c) noninternational armed conflicts that meet the height-
ened requirements of Protocol II;
(d) international armed conflicts within the meaning of
Protocol I (e.g., situations in which an indigenous pop-
ulation is resisting colonial domination);
(e) sufficiently internationalized armed conflicts that
trigger the greater part of the protections of the 1949
Geneva Conventions; and
(f) traditional international armed conflicts pitting two
High Contracting Parties against each other that also
trigger the bulk of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Choice of Law Implications of Conflict
Classification
The question of conflict classification is more than academic in
ICL. From the perspective of positive law, only the Geneva
Conventions governing international (or sufficiently interna-
tionalized armed conflicts) create a penal regime of war crimes.
Within those treaties, it is only certain ‘‘grave breaches’’ of the
treaties that give rise to individual criminal responsibility. By
their own terms, violations of other treaty provisions (including
much of the four Geneva Conventions and common Article 3)
and whole treaties (Protocol II and the Hague Conventions)
only give rise to the civil liability of states and do not set forth
any individual penal sanctions.
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Nonetheless, the ad hoc tribunals have made quick work of
dismantling distinctions between the norms applicable in
international and noninternational armed conflicts that were
so carefully crafted by states during the IHL treaty-drafting
process. As a result, much conduct prohibited or criminalized
in international armed conflicts now constitutes war crimes
even if committed in internal or other noninternational con-
flicts. With respect to the ICTY, this process was enabled by
the formulation of the war crimes provisions of the ICTY Stat-
ute. Article 2 of the ICTY Statute reproduced the grave
breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions. Article 3 of the
ICTY Statute extended the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to cover
‘‘violations of the laws and customs of war’’ including a non-
exhaustive list of violations of the Fourth Hague Convention.
The Tribunal interpreted this latter provision expansively to
penalize violations of common Article 3 as well as other pro-
hibitions within the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols,
finding authority for this assertion in customary international
law rather than treaty law.
In penalizing violations of common Article 3 and Protocol
II, the ICTY has essentially merged the law governing
international and noninternational armed conflicts, rendering
conflict classification a virtually irrelevant exercise in its pro-
ceedings. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic´ was quite self-
conscious about this, having found that national practice
and the inroads made by the international human rights regime
into areas traditionally shrouded by state sovereignty have
‘‘blur[red] the traditional dichotomy between international
wars and civil strife.’’17 In addition, as most global conflicts
are internal in character, the distinction between the two bod-
ies of law seemed increasingly arbitrary and outmoded to
modern tribunals.18 This merger now finds positive expression
in Article 8 of the ICC Statute, indicating that this expansive
approach has been largely—although not entirely— ratified
by the community of states. As a result, the ICC can prosecute
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almost all war crimes committed in any type of conflict as can
states that have harmonized their domestic penal codes with
the ICC Statute.
Despite the modern trend toward conflating the rules gov-
erning international and internal armed conflicts, the question
of conflict classification remains relevant to determine the
particular rules that apply in any armed conflict. Indeed, the
question of conflict classification has been central to the juris-
prudence arising out of the global ‘‘war on terror’’ and in
particular for legal efforts to challenge the policy of the United
States to detain individuals captured in Afghanistan and else-
where at Guanta´namo Bay and prosecute them before military
commissions. In a case contesting the legality of the military
commission scheme as originally established by the Bush
administration, the U.S. Supreme Court dodged the question
of whether the full Geneva Conventions applied to the hostil-
ities.19 It did rule, however, that at a minimum the protections
of common Article 3 were applicable, and in particular found
applicable the requirement that persons ‘‘taking no active part
in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’
by . . . detention’’ can only be tried by a ‘‘regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples.’’ The Court struck
down the original military commission scheme in part because
of its failure to adhere to the provisions of common Article 3.
Expanding a penal regime to noninternational armed conflicts
has also destabilized the conventional thinking about the inter-
section between war crimes and the crimes of terrorism, as will
be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
Nexus to Armed Conflict
Establishing the applicability of IHL and of war crimes prohi-
bitions does not end the inquiry of whether and how an
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individual can be prosecuted for the commission of a violent
act in the context of an armed conflict. In particular, it must
still be determined whether the act in question—such as an
act of murder or the theft of property—constitutes a war crime
as opposed to a simple domestic crime or some other
international crime. Only offenses that have some sort of a
nexus to an armed conflict fall within the category of war
crimes under IHL. If there is no link between the offense
and the armed conflict, then the act must be charged under
some other head of ICL or under domestic criminal law.
The ad hoc tribunals have struggled with how to define this
link. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic´ stated
that ‘‘there must be an obvious link between the criminal act
and the armed conflict.’’20 In Tadic´, another Trial Chamber
noted that ‘‘the offences [must be] closely related to the
armed conflict as a whole.’’21 Defining this link became par-
ticularly acute in the Rwandan context, because although the
genocide occurred nationwide, the actual theater of war—
which pitted the government armed forces against the Tutsi-
led Rwandan Patriotic Front—only engulfed part of the
country. This led to a number of acquittals on war crimes
counts, although most defendants were convicted of genocide
and crimes against humanity, which require no link to armed
conflict.
In theAkayesu case, for example, the Trial Chamber acquit-
ted the defendant of war crimes charges on the ground that ‘‘it
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the acts
perpetrated by Akayesu . . . were committed in conjunction
with the armed conflict.’’22 Likewise, in Kayishema, the Trial
Chamber ruled that it was insufficient to show a simple
temporal concurrence between the crimes charged and the
internal armed conflict ensuing elsewhere in the country.
Rather, the Trial Chamber required a showing that ‘‘there
was a direct link between crimes committed against these vic-
tims and the hostilities’’23 and that the defendants were
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connected to one of the two embattled parties.24 The Trial
Chamber also noted that the armed conflict had been used
as pretext to unleash an official policy of genocide, but that
these two phenomena were distinct within the region in
question.
The ICTY sub silentio disagreed with this approach. In the
Kunarac case, it ruled that although the armed conflict must
have ‘‘played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to
commit [the charged crime], his decision to commit it, the
manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which
it was committed,’’ it was enough if, as in the present case, ‘‘the
perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the
armed conflict.’’25 The Tribunal identified a nonexclusive
series of factors that would help to guide this inquiry:
 the perpetrator is a combatant;
 the victim is a noncombatant;
 the victim is a member of the opposing party;
 the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military
campaign; and
 the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the
perpetrator’s official duties.26
In the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, drafters settled on the
following formulation: It must be shown that the charged con-
duct ‘‘took place in the context of and was associated with’’ an
international or noninternational armed conflict. This formu-
lation eases up on the strict requirements established in
Kayishema and seems to imply the necessity only of a geograph-
ical and temporal nexus.
Protected Persons
The collective goal of the Geneva treaty regime is to mitigate
the effects of war by primarily protecting four classes of per-
sons who do not, or who can no longer, participate in
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hostilities. Thus, the four Geneva Conventions apply to (1) the
sick and wounded on land (Geneva Convention I); (2) the sick
and wounded at sea (Geneva Convention II); (3) POWs
(Geneva Convention III); and (4) civilians, or more accurately,
anyone who does not fall into one of the other treaties’ protec-
tive regimes (Geneva Convention IV). Each treaty contains a
provision defining the class of protected persons. The Fourth
Geneva Convention acts as a catch-all for individuals who fall
outside of the prior three regimes. For example, Article 4 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention defines its protected persons as
follows:
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find them-
selves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are
not nationals. Nationals of a State which is not bound by the
Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral
State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent
State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be
regarded as protected persons while the State of which
they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in
the State in whose hands they are. . . . Persons protected
by [one of the other three Conventions] shall not be consid-
ered as protected persons within the meaning of the present
Convention.
Key elements of this definition are the fact that the individual is
‘‘in the hands of’’ a party ‘‘of which they are not nationals’’—
that is, a different nation state—and not protected by one of
the other Conventions. This definition does, however, exclude
from protection individuals who are nationals of a state that is
aligned with their captors’ state or that is neutral. Accordingly,
although Geneva Convention IV’s title indicates its aim is to
protect ‘‘civilian persons in time of war,’’ it also provides pro-
tection to combatants who do not meet the definition of POWs
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in Article 4 of Geneva Convention III. This includes so-called
‘‘unprivileged belligerents’’— irregular combatants who are not
part of a High Contracting Party’s military force or who are
nationals of states not formally at war—although this point
remains contentious.
In connection with the global ‘‘war on terror,’’ for example,
the U.S. government has argued that none of the detainees
held in Guanta´namo or elsewhere is entitled to claim protec-
tion under the Geneva Conventions because, under the U.S.
government’s reading, these individuals meet neither the def-
inition of ‘‘prisoner of war’’ under Geneva Convention III nor
the definition of ‘‘civilian’’ pursuant to Geneva Convention IV.
Instead, the Bush administration has employed an alternative
terminology, calling these individuals ‘‘enemy combatants’’ or
‘‘unlawful enemy combatants’’— terms that are not employed
within IHL or any of its treaties. Furthermore, the Fourth
Geneva Convention’s definition of protected person set forth
earlier does not turn on combatant or civilian status. That said,
many of the individuals detained by the United States were
captured within the context of a noninternational armed con-
flict, the regulation of which by international law does not
contain a POW regime. In addition, many of these individuals
are not nationals of a High Contracting Party with which the
United States is at war. The U.S. courts have yet to rule defin-
itively on how these individuals should be characterized under
the well-established classificatory system of the Geneva Con-
ventions and thus which protections should be accorded to
them.27
Under the conventional regime, only protected persons can
be the victims of war crimes. This requirement has been
relaxed in the recent jurisprudence. For example, in the former
Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims often found themselves ‘‘in the
hands of’’ Bosnian Serb paramilitary troops with whom they
shared a nationality, but not an ethnicity or ultimate allegiance.
The ICTY rejected arguments that no war crimes were
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committed because the victim and the perpetrator shared a
bond of citizenship when it held:
While previously wars were primarily between well-
established States, in modern inter-ethnic armed conflicts
such as that in the former Yugoslavia, new States are often
created during the conflict and ethnicity rather than nation-
ality may become the grounds for allegiance. Or, put another
way, ethnicity may become determinative of national alle-
giance. Under these conditions, the requirement of national-
ity is even less adequate to define protected persons. In such
conflicts, not only the text and the drafting history of the
Convention but also, and more importantly, the Convention’s
object and purpose suggest that allegiance to a Party to the
conflict and, correspondingly, control by this Party over per-
sons in a given territory, may be regarded as the crucial test.28
By adopting a functional and teleological approach to the
treaties and to the concept of ‘‘protected persons,’’ the ICTY
significantly diminished the significance of nationality in
determining protected person status. This ruling has implica-
tions for the ‘‘war on terror’’, suggesting that nationality alone
should not be the basis for excluding individuals from the pro-
tections of the Geneva Conventions.
Means and Methods of Warfare
Hague law is not organized by protected group; rather, it sets
forth rules concerning the methods and means of warfare that
seek to regulate what kinds of weapons are allowed, what con-
stitutes a legitimate military target, and what type and degree of
force is permissible. Hague law traditionally, and by its terms,
only applied to international conflicts. Modern developments
before the international criminal tribunals and within the ICC
Statute, however, have extended many of these principles to
noninternational armed conflicts.
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The Hague Conventions originally established both basic
principles and more specific rules governing the means and
methods of warfare and the use of force in pursuit of a military
objective. Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions recodi-
fied many of these principles and rules, thus signaling the
convergence of Hague and Geneva traditions. This body of
law most importantly subjects the use of force within an
armed conflict to the interlocking principles of necessity, dis-
tinction, and proportionality. Necessity requires that armed
attacks be designed and intended to defeat the opponent mil-
itarily. Thus, Article 52(2) of Protocol I states:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far
as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization,
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military of advantage.
The principle of distinction requires that parties to an armed
conflict distinguish between legitimate military targets and
illegitimate targets, such as civilians or civilian infrastructure.
Article 48 of Protocol I provides that ‘‘[p]arties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population
and combatants.’’ Not surprisingly, interpretive problems arise
with respect to so-called dual-use facilities, such as bridges,
power plants, or communication facilities. Indiscriminate
attacks are also prohibited. Article 51 of Protocol I defines
indiscriminate attacks to include ‘‘[t]hose [attacks] which
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and conse-
quently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.’’
This principle has also been interpreted to prohibit certain
types of weapons (such as cluster bombs and landmines)
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that, by their very nature, do not discriminate among lawful
and unlawful targets. The international community has pro-
mulgated multilateral treaties to this effect, although many of
the major suppliers and consumers of these weapons have yet
to sign or ratify these treaties.
The principle of proportionality states that when military
force is used for a proper military objective, only that force that
is proportional to the military objective to be gained may be
used. If a choice of weaponry or tactics is available, the com-
mander should choose those that will cause the least incidental
harm. Civilian casualties in and of themselves are not neces-
sarily unlawful. Rather, only those attacks that cause damage
to civilian objects that is excessive in relation to the anticipated
military advantage of the attack are prohibited. The greater the
degree of military advantage anticipated, the more so-called
collateral damage is allowed. Thus, civilian casualties do not
indicate a violation of the laws of war where they are the result
of an attack that is proportional to the military objective sought.
Hague law thus approaches the question of legality from
the point of view of lawful military objectives and related activ-
ity. Geneva law takes a more rights-based approach, defining
categories of people and the protections to which they are
entitled. As should be clear, however, although the focus of
Hague and Geneva law is somewhat different, the rules serve
to reinforce each other. Indeed, Geneva law’s protection of
vulnerable classes of individuals from the effects of armed
conflict and the Hague rules governing the principle of distinc-
tion and the legitimate use of force during an armed conflict
are in essence two sides of the same coin.
War Crimes Before the International
Criminal Court
The ICC’s list of war crimes contains a partial synthesis of
Geneva and Hague law, the two major strands of jus in
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bello. Rather than adopt an open-ended provision along the
lines of the ICTY Statute’s Article 3, the drafters chose to
specifically list chargeable crimes (51 in total) to better adhere
to the principle of legality. The entire section is preceded by a
threshold provision at Article 8(1) that emphasizes that the
ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes ‘‘in particular when com-
mitted as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.’’
The remainder of the article itself is quite unwieldy by
virtue of the fact that it separately enumerates the crimes appli-
cable in international armed conflicts (Article 8(2)(a) and (b))
and noninternational armed conflicts (Article 8(2)(c)-(f)). The
latter provisions are subject to two different triggering prere-
quisites. Common Article 3 crimes can be charged with
respect to noninternational armed conflicts that are distinct
from ‘‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence, or other acts of a similar nature’’
(Article 8(2)(d)). In this way, the drafters essentially applied
some of the provisions contained in Protocol II’s material field
of application (Article 1(2)) to common Article 3. The other
crimes can be charged with respect to ‘‘armed conflicts that
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups’’ (Article
8(2)(f)). This limitation mirrors the Tadic´ test, as discussed
previously.
Article 8 also contains separate subsections reproducing
the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (Article
8(2)(a)) and the violations of common Article 3 (Article
8(2)(c)). The remainder of the article enumerates crimes
according to the laws and customs of war, as drawn from the
Hague Conventions, Protocol II, other IHL treaties (such as
those protecting cultural property or prohibiting particular
weapons of war), and other sources. In identifying these lists
of customary crimes, the drafters were guided by two main
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considerations: the gravity of the acts in question and whether
they merited international prosecution, and whether the
particular acts gave rise to individual criminal responsibility
under either customary or treaty law. Although the drafters
often claimed that they were merely codifying existing law, it
is impossible not to conclude that some progressive develop-
ment in the law occurred, especially with respect to the crimes
that may be committed within noninternational armed
conflicts.
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